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The M�well Case
John A.E. Pottow*
This chapter will provide some broader context regarding the fa
mous Maxwell Communication bankruptcy, which is one of the most
significant cross-border insolvency precedents to date. 1 It does so by first
looking at Bob Maxwell's life and business in roughly chronological
stages (the good, the bad, and the ugly). It then explores the insolvency
proceedings that bear his name (the beautiful) and one specific litigation
action within those proceedings of particular importance (the exquisite).
Finally, it offers some brief reflection on what the Maxwell case may
have taught us (the sublime).
The Good
In a squalid Carpathian village called Solotvino, Jan Ludwik Hock
was born on June 10, 1923. He would later become known by a variety of
monikers, including the Bouncing Czech, Cap'n Bob, and, more formally,
Ian Robert Maxwell. Maxwell rose from these impoverished beginnings
(not to mention the murder of most of his family during the Holocaust)
to become one of the wealthiest people in his adopted homeland, the
United Kingdom. During his life, he ascended to the pinnacles of social
acceptance, including sitting as Member of Parliament for North Buck
inghamshire in the 1960s, and descended into the bowels of (mostly
posthumous) disgrace. He was a huge figure, both physically and meta
phorically, who will not easily be forgotten.
Maxwell's life began unremarkably in Eastern Europe. He started
school in his village and then went away to Bratislava for further
education. But soon thereafter the second world war broke out, and the
young Maxwell joined the Czech army. He then in turn transferred to
the British army upon picking up English (one of the many languages he
would ultimately master). Maxwell fought as a brave soldier for the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Apart from my own research, the sources for this chapter on Maxwell's life and
business come primarily from two excellent books: ToM BowER, MAxWELL, THE FINAL VERDICT
(Harper Collins, 1996), written by an investigative journalist who attended the whole
criminal trial, and N1cK DAVIES, DEATH OF A TYcooN, AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF THE FALL OF
RoBERT MAxwELL (St. Martin's Press, 1992), written by the Mirror's foreign affairs editor.
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United Kingdom against the Nazis, receiving the Military Cross by Field
Marshal Montgomery and rising to the rank of Captain. But perhaps his
most important accomplishment during wartime was noncombatant: he
was assigned to help supervise a newspaper, Der Telegraph, which was
the first licensed broadsheet in the British sector of occupied Berlin.
Running a newspaper must have kindled an entrepreneurial spark
in the young Maxwell (a name which by this point he had adopted, after
trying out, among others, Ivan du Maurier and Leslie Jones). He soon
approached a German scientific publisher named Ferdinand Springer.
Springer's company had established an excellent reputation in the inter
national academic community before the war broke out, but was facing
Allied-imposed restrictions on exports. Revealing his propensity for deal
making at an early age, Maxwell negotiated with Springer to become
designated the U.K. and U.S. distributor of Springer publications. For
tuitously, at about the same time, the British government independently
decided that the United Kingdom needed more Springer-like scientific
publishing houses to advance its own scientific interests throughout the
world and to disseminate British technology. Maxwell was thus excel
lently situated to leverage his new partnership with Springer in scientific
publishing. To do so, he further teamed up with an Austrian scientist
named Paul Rosabud (the spy who warned the British that the Germans
were developing the bomb and who helped locate the Norway heavy
water plant). Together, they bought out British publisher Butterworths'
stake in a Butterworth-Springer joint business venture. With some help
from the U.K. government, and combining Springer's international
reputation with Rosabud's scientific acumen, Maxwell launched what
became known as Pergamon Press. Pergamon quickly blossomed into a
worldwide scientific publishing powerhouse.
Pergamon's ascent put Maxwell on the map as a serious internation
al businessman. But this was not enough for a man of his ambition.
What he seemed to hunger for-perhaps remembering his Der Telegraph
days in Berlin, or perhaps craving the social acceptance of a still class
conscious postwar British society-was to own a newspaper. (Maxwell
was indeed sensitive to status; it is well known, for example, that he
preferred to be addressed as "Captain Maxwell" for quite some time
after the war.) Accordingly, in the late 1960s, Maxwell launched a highly
visible and quasi-hostile takeover bid of News of the World. He ultimate
ly lost-scooped by his Australian rival, Rupert Murdoch. Moreover, in
the process he had to put his beloved Pergamon on the block to finance
the bid. This is what led to his first scandal. Maxwell had arranged to
sell Pergamon to a young American entrepreneur named Saul Steinberg
(an interesting character in his own right who had made his money in
computer leasing-in the 1960s no less). The Pergamon sale, however,
went south. Steinberg was not amused that the accounts at Pergamon
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were apparently inflated: the assets had not, as reported, tripled recent
ly, and the profits were not, as claimed, £2 million. He complained
formally, and Britain's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
launched an investigation. The DTI officials ultimately produced a report
in 1973 laying the blame on Maxwell, finding that he had "reckless and
unjustified optimism which enabled him on some occasions to disregard
unpalatable facts and on others to state what he must have known to be
untrue." They accordingly concluded that "notwithstanding Mr[.] Max
well's acknowledged abilities and energies," he was not "a person who
can be relied on to exercise proper stewardship of a publicly quoted
company." This was obviously humiliating for a prominent businessman
like Maxwell, but he ended up getting the last laugh by repurchasing
Pergamon for £1.5 million in 1974. The DTI's words, later to prove
prophetic, went unheeded.
Indeed, by 1981, Maxwell had put the DTI behind him and was back
to being the darling of the City (London's financial sector). He was given
all sorts of money to acquire control of the British Printing Corporation
("BPC"), which later became British Printing & Communication Corp.,
and which in turn became Maxwell Communication Corp. ("MCC", a
name Maxwell insisted was merely a modernization and not "an ego
trip"). MCC was an important keystone in Maxwell's empire-which by
the time of his death included over 400 companies-because it was the
only major publicly traded company he controlled; he ultimately ended
up owning about 60% of its shares. (Strictly speaking, Maxwell con
trolled a second major U.K. public company, the Mirror Group Newspa
pers, but that company only went public shortly before his death.)
Maxwell's turnaround of MCC (nee BPC) exhibited the ruthlessness and
genius for which Maxwell was deservedly famous. Busting the unions
through a combination of charm, bravado, and sheer stamina, Maxwell
turned Britain's largest publisher from a money loser into a profitable
enterprise in just a number of years. In the 1980s era of the leveraged
buy-out, banks tripped over themselves to shower Maxwell with money
to finance his latest corporate acquisition. "Bob's gone shopping," the
bankers would often joke as he would declare his latest target (while
they gorged themselves on the attendant fees).
It was not until 1984, however, when he was in his sixties, that
Maxwell finally fulfilled that elusive dream: he acquired the Mirror
Group newspapers for a little over £90 million. He set up headquarters
in Maxwell House in Holborn (the printing section of London that
includes Fleet Street), just next to the Mirror building, and declared
himself "The Publisher." The Daily Mirror, a London staple, was a once
famous but then money-losing paper that Maxwell was determined to
turn around. And he did, bringing it back to profit handsomely. Owning
a major London paper, Maxwell seemed happy at last. He enjoyed its
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trappings to the fullest, such as dictating editorial page content. He had
become a true media mogul.
But even wild financial success was not enough to sate Maxwell
completely. He also became preoccupied during the 1980s with insinuat
ing himself into positions of political prominence. In the crumbling days
of the Soviet Empire, the multilingual Maxwell was especially interested
in maintaining close contacts with senior Russian political figures, keep
ing up connections he had made that went all the way back to the war.
(This was true in other countries as well; he was fond of telling people he
dined with President Bush.) For example, one of his main Russian
contacts was KGB head Yuri Andropov, who briefly succeeded Leonid
Brezhniv as General Secretary before suddenly dying. Maxwell's greatest
political "affiliation," however, was with Israel, where he would meet
with various important officials such as Ariel Sharon, then-Health Minis
ter Ehoud Omert, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Thus, Maxwell
had the ear (at least to some extent) of many world leaders-he famously
once called Mikhail Gorbachev directly from Shamir' s office and spoke to
him in Russian-although he likely overstated his own importance. At
the height of his self-aggrandizement of political importance he once
rebuked The Mirror's editor, Roy Greenslade (whom he later sacked),
regarding the Soviet invasion of Lithuania: "Do you realize that Gorba
chev wouldn't do anything without ringing me first?" This anecdote is
not to make fun of the late Maxwell's self-importance; he accomplished
tremendous good through his international political hob-nobbing, includ
ing the arrangement of transit for Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel.
Rather, it is to underscore the fact that at this point in his career,
Maxwell was more focused on his public appearances than tending to his
business empire.
When Maxwell did turn his attention to business in these later
years, even that seemed more animated by fame than finance. For
example, he likely overpaid in spending more than $2 billion on the
purchase of Macmillan, the prestigious American publishing company, in
1988. And his 1991 rescue buyout of the New York Daily News was
nothing short of quixotic. The Daily News acquisition was vintage
Maxwell: a highly publicized, against-all-odds kind of deal where he rode
into Manhattan as a white knight aboard his ostentatious yacht, The
Lady Ghislaine, to save the day. He was going to work the Maxwell
magic and rescue a cultural icon from oblivion. Duly feted by the mayor
of New York and appropriate public dignitaries, Maxwell proudly embla
zoned his visage on the cover of the News at the culmination of the deal:
Cap'n Bob Bites the Big Apple. His purchase of a New York newspaper
accorded him a new source of cachet-an entry into an even tonier circle
than his one at home in London.
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Thus by the beginning of the 1990s, the world truly was Maxwell's
oyster. He was a media mogul with a far-flung international business
empire. There was only one, tiny problem: it was a fraudulent house of
cards.

The Bad
Right about the time Maxwell was unsuccessfully trying to acquire
News of the World in the late 1960s, an American comedy writer named
Mel Brooks was directing his first film, The Producers. In the movie, a
washed-up theatrical producer and his nebbish accountant realize that
an easier way to make money on Broadway than staging a hit is actually
to stage a flop. This counterintuitive discovery comes from the idea that
if the producers raise a pile of cash from investors to put on a play, but
the play is a disaster, then no one is likely to request an accounting-in
the way one might request an accounting to ensure the fair share of
profit from a successful venture. If you produce a flop, there are no
profits to share; everyone's lost everything, so there's no point fighting
for an accounting. The scheming protagonists extend this reasoning to
conclude that if they can raise more money than they need to stage a
play, but know from the outset that it will be a flop, then they can get
away with siphoning off large amounts of the investors' money, secure in
the knowledge there will never be an audit to expose them. (The comedic
premise thus set, the two producers spend the movie seeking to stage the
worst play ever, culminating in the debut of a fictional musical, Spring
time for Hitler, "a gay romp for Eva and Adolf." Brooks deservedly
picked up the Academy Award for Best Original Screenplay.)
One of the funnier scenes in the movie (or, more precisely, one of
the funnier scenes in the movie to a professor of bankruptcy law) comes
when Gene Wilder's accountant is adding aloud the various percentage
shares they have sold of the play. His partner, Zero Mostel, is beside him
listening and eventually interrupts to ask in puzzlement just how many
percentage shares they are allowed to sell. Wilder explains, "You can
only sell 100% of anything." "And how much of Springtime for Hitler
have we sold?" Pause. "25,000%." They realize there is no turning back.
It is an elegant con in its simplicity, and it is basically the same
thing that Maxwell did. Unlike the fictional impresarios Bialystock &
Bloom, however, Maxwell was not planning to go bankrupt. But he did
effectively sell and re-sell the same shares of some of his companies to
unwitting banks (who probably should have known better had they done
sound due diligence) in a desperate attempt to raise funds for what was,
despite its outward appearance, a secretly cash-starved empire. So struc
tural were the financial flaws that at one point MCC was paying out a
dividend of £112 million but only making £97 million in profit. Maxwell
was duping the likes of Goldman Sachs in the United States, NatWest in
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the United Kingdom, and SocGen in France. When he asked for loans,
they just could not say no to The Publisher (and his fees). Toward the
end, Maxwell was literally borrowing from one bank to pay off loans to
another as he tried to hide the mounting losses of his companies.
How specifically did Maxwell fool his lenders? He used several
tricks. First of all, recognize that Maxwell privately owned much of his
empire, through a holding company called Headington Investments (and
actually owned most of it by a Liechtenstein stiftung-a sort of trust
that benefited from Liechtenstein's privacy-dominated banking laws as
being inscrutable to outside regulators). This was called "the private
side" of his empire. But there was also the "public side," namely, the
stock-exchange-listed MCC, of which Maxwell owned a controlling stake
through his private side holding companies. Never a stickler for legal
formalities, Maxwell rarely recognized corporate form, so would often
transfer funds freely from the public side to the private side via jointly
controlled bank accounts. Indeed, he would even group his various
corporate assets by sector for business purposes (such as the "Electronic
Publishing Group") rather than by whether they were owned by the
public side (MCC) or the private side (Headington Investments et al.). So
one way he misbehaved was by looting the public side for the benefit of
the private side by inter-company transfers.
The reason Maxwell made these payments from the public side to
the private side was that he needed to service extensive private side
loans. At first these loans were used to fund investments, but later they
were used for more nefarious purposes. To secure these private side
loans, Maxwell pledged shares of the various companies he owned as
collateral, often even his shares of MCC itself. The dizzying pace of
Maxwell's affairs made keeping track of the physical custody of these
shares pledged as collateral difficult, even for banks who wanted to look.
And besides, no one asks one of the wealthiest people in the world
whether he is good for the property he is pledging as collateral, especially
if one wants to earn future banking fees. Ironically, even the banks who
were diligent enough to inspect the shares pledged as private side
collateral would often find it difficult to penetrate the maze of subsidiar
ies and affiliates in Maxwell's corporate empire. For example, the physi
cal shares would sometimes be in the name of "Bishopgates Investment
Trust, as nominee," one of Maxwell's many subsidiaries. That would
usually be enough for Maxwell's cronies to handwave and say "see, these
shares are owned somewhere on the private side." But in the post
mortem of Maxwell's affairs, it became clear that the same shares had
been pledged and repledged as collateral to multiple banks (the equiva
lent of selling more than 100% of a play). More ominously, it also became
clear that Bishopsgate was actually affiliated with the deliberately simi
larly named "London and Bishopsgate Investments," which was the
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corporation designed to invest the pool of Maxwell's various employee
pension funds. In other words, he was not only repledging the same
shares to different lenders, he was pledging shares that he did not even
own in the first place: shares that belonged to his employees' pension
fund, which he managed, with the approval of U.K. regulators, with one
of his own private side companies.
The hope behind this type of fraud is that it will never be discover
ed. After all, if the underlying loans could eventually be repaid or
refinanced, then no one would have cared that the loans were backed
with illegitimate collateral; the deceit would have been a kind of harm
less error (at least so rationalizes the perpetrator). So unlike the outright
thieves in The Producers, Maxwell was not trying to steal money from
the pension funds; he was trying to use the pension fund's assets
(illegally) to back loans that he genuinely believed would be paid off as
soon as his businesses got back on course. Indeed, one of Maxwell's final
financing attempts for the empire was a Hail Mary float of the Mirror
Group on the London stock exchange in 1991 (in the U.S. this would be
called "taking it public" with an "initial public offering" or "IPO"). Had
the IPO been well received by the market, it could have generated
enough cash to retire many of the loans; sadly, however, it fizzled in a
recessionary environment. So the hope was that nobody would ever be
the wiser about the doubly pledged collateral and use of pension fund
shares to secure the bank loans. All would be fine so long as the monthly
loan payments could be made on time. The problem, of course, was that
if the payments could not be met on the underlying loans, then the
whole affair would come crashing down. This is essentially what hap
pened, spectacularly, in 1991.
The first chinks in the armor were rumors that began circulating
about extensive private side loans and that Maxwell was overleveraging
his companies. There was also some talk about "questionable" profit
forecasts. When banks get antsy about their exposure on a worrisome
loan, but do not yet want to call it, what they often do is check their
collateral to see how good it looks. (They also often ask for even more
collateral to make themselves feel safe on these shaky debts.) So when
the initial rumblings began, everyone started watching the public share
price of MCC very closely-the dominant stock that served as loan
collateral. According to his staff, Maxwell himself was notoriously ob
sessed with the daily price quote of MCC, probably knowing more than
anyone else its true importance. He seemed outwardly relieved that it
continued to remain high, even as the 1990s recession descended and
unsustainable dividends poured out. What was uncovered only later in
investigations was that one of the enthusiastic purchasers of MCC stock
who kept the price in the market so high during this time was Maxwell
himself, often through his inscrutable Lichtenstein stiftungs, through

228

THE MAXWELL CASE

buy-ups frequently laundered through his American brokers at Goldman
Sachs. To finance these MCC shares (and declining to report publicly
these accumulations, possibly on the theory the stiftungs were beyond
the jurisdiction of securities disclosure rules), Maxwell had to borrow
even more money on the private side. This was the nefarious use of the
borrowed funds: not only was he raising cash on the private side by
pledging pension fund assets and sometimes even repledging the same
assets to multiple banks, but he was using these loans to trick the
market into thinking MCC's stock price would stay firm and hence that
the banks had no need to call their loans.
Maxwell tried to maintain his charade for as long as possible. For
example, when bankers would ask about missed loan payments, Maxwell
or someone in his inner circle (mostly his heir apparent and youngest
son, Kevin) would complain vaguely about a "back-office snafu," assur
ing the pressing lender that repayment would be forthcoming. Eventual
ly, however, the wiser banks got fed up and started calling their loans
and liquidating the collateral-the shares of MCC. This flood on the
market of MCC stock depressed its price, making other banks that held
MCC as security even more anxious with their positions, and hence more
inclined to call their loans-which they began to do in increasing
number. The death spiral began. Needless to say, litigation quickly arose
when different creditors laid claim to the proceeds of the shares that
were sold. The pension fund itself laid claim to these shares too,
contending Maxwell had breached his fiduciary duty by pledging them to
banks in the first place. It was a mess. In the aftermath, the various
banks and accountants all contributed money through fines and settle
ments into a pension recovery trust such that the pensioners were made
mostly, but not completely, whole. Coopers & Lybrand, the auditors who
insisted that their jobs as professionals did not encompass second
guessing the financial reports of in-house Maxwell financial staff,
coughed up a cool £68 million in fines for the fund. In a pre-Enron era,
this was huge.
While simultaneously assuaging external bankers, Maxwell also had
to placate and confuse his internal financial staff. On the private side
this was easier; he was able to hush things up by co-opting an inner
circle of cronies, some of whom stood in dock at the Old Bailey to answer
for their acts along with Maxwell's sons. The task was harder to do with
MCC, which had to comply with public corporation compliance rules and
file reports. Some of the eventual whistleblowers were the outside
directors, led by Peter Laister, and the finance chief at MCC, Basil
Brookes. But even they were held at bay after their first inklings of
fraud by a combination of cowardice, instruction by counsel not to
disclose damaging information about the corporation (such as its fraudu
lent financial underpinnings), disinclination to cut off the gravy train of
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their salaries, and, perhaps most significantly, Maxwell's own overpower
ing charm and assurance. Basil Brooks, for example, later testified that
when he approached Maxwell with irregular transfers to the private side
and the draining of cash from MCC's corporate coffers, he was told that
private side accountants would be looking into matters and getting to
the bottom of it, so not to worry. He was also told it was largely
irrelevant because MCC already owed the private side millions of
pounds, for which the transfers could be considered "repayments." (This
was false-the private side was actually heavily indebted to MCC
through these transfers.) It is not surprising even the accountants were
confused To give just a flavor of how some of these inter-company
transactions operated, here is one example, as reported in the case In re
Maxwell Communication Corp.2 Property, say valuable real estate, from
MCC would be "sold" to a freshly created legal entity, but with a
deferred payment date of the purchase price. The legal entity, as new
owner of the property, would of course have a debt to pay off a few years
down the line, but before it would do so, the entity itself would be sold to
one of the Stiftung-controlled companies for a pittance. As the new title
holder of the real property, the Stiftung could then transfer the land
directly to the private side, where it would in turn become available as
collateral to raise more loans. All this would occur with no cash changing
hands, as the deferred payment date on the original sale was still years
off.
Even the great Maxwell, however, could only tap-dance for so long.
At the same time that some of the more astute outside banks were
getting wise and calling their loans, the outside directors of MCC were
demanding explanations and screwing up the courage to present ultima
tums to Maxwell. And it was just at this crucial time, when things were
all beginning to unravel, that Robert Maxwell's body was found floating
in the Mediterranean Sea, on 5 November 1991.
To call his death "mysterious" puts matters mildly. It is clear that
he entered the sea from the Lady Ghislaine, which was operating on her
last voyage of the season with a skeleton crew and no guests, somewhere
near the Canary Islands. (Maxwell had telephoned the Captain, Gus
Rankin, unexpectedly just a few days before and said he wanted one last
visit to the yacht while she was still in Europe.) Whether Maxwell
jumped off, was pushed, or accidentally stumbled (or was somehow else
killed and then dumped) fueled a cottage industry of conspiracy theorists
intrigued by his clear connections to the KGB and Mossad. (One of the
popular K GB theories has to do with a role Maxwell had in laundering
its money for the outside world and the speculation that when the Berlin
2.

fl995] 1 BCLC 521.
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Wall and old guard fell, some were disappointed to discover the amount
of money he siphoned off for himself as payment for services.)
There are unanswered questions still to this day. As recently as
2005, a Discovery Channel documentary explored the possibility that the
cause of Maxwell's death was actually injected air to make an embolism,
and in 2006, it was revealed that Maxwell was being investigated for an
alleged war crime at the time of his death. Two autopsies were conduct
ed in 1 991, and his insurers, unenthusiastic about paying out a £20
million policy, declared it was suicide. The ambiguous medical evidence
suggested a possible minor heart attack, but that only begged the
question whether it happened on board, causing him to stumble, or after
he fell (or jumped) (or was pushed) overboard. There were no witnesses.
The forensic evidence also raised some eyebrows, such as the amount of
time his body was in the water in light of the prevailing ocean currents.
There was also Rankin's curious statement that Maxwell's empty state
room was locked from the inside when the crew tried to rouse him in the
morning. While Maxwell was quickly given something akin to a state
funeral in Israel (with Chaim Herzog, Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon Peres,
Ariel Sharon, and Ehoud Olmert all in attendance) and buried at the
Mount of Olives, the mystery surrounding his death was only beginning.
Maxwell died in November. While his son Kevin tried to maintain
the fa�ade with the banks for a bit longer, he was eventually pushed
aside by MCC 's directors (as well as MGN's, which had become publicly
traded) . By December the whole empire, both public and private, was put
into bankruptcy proceedings. Thus began what is probably the most
important transnational insolvency case to date: In re Maxwell Commu
nication Corp. plc. 3

The Ugly
One the hardest tasks in sifting through Maxwell's affairs after his
death was disentangling his byzantine empire of over 400 companies.
Where were the assets? Who held them? Who had claims against them?
How many were left? Which were owned by the public side and which by
the private side? How many were secreted away in inscrutable Lichten
stein trusts? How much money did the private side truly owe the public
side through Maxwell-sanctioned, inter-company loans? That on its own
was a difficult headache of forensic accountancy. But what made this
already challenging task even more complicated were lingering choice of
law issues. For example, if there were fraud claims, as it quickly
appeared there would be, would they be resolved under U.S. law? British
law? Lichtenstein law? The dizzying transactions and loans within the
empire soon made clear that the whole network would probably have to
3.

(1992] BCLC 1402 (original appointment of British insolvency administrators) .

JOHN A.E. POTTOW

23 1

be "washed" through the insolvency system and subjected to legal
scrutiny, even stand-alone companies, such as Macmillan, that on their
own seemed profitable and solvent.
Accordingly, everyone conceded that a bankruptcy day of reckoning
had arrived. (Even Kevin Maxwell himself had to file for bankruptcy in
the United Kingdom in 1992, making his the largest personal bankrupt
cy estate ever administered, at £406 million.) But a key, and difficult,
question remained: where to file? For Headington, that seemed easy: it
was a U.K. holding company that held mostly U.K. investments. It filed
a petition before the High Court in England and an administrator (the
court-appointed officer who takes over an insolvent company under U.K.
law-usually an accountant) was appointed. But on the public side, MCC
presented a more unusual case. It was a British corporation, traded on
the British stock exchange, overseen by British directors, and managed
by Maxwell out of his "Maxwell House" Holborn headquarters in Lon
don. But by 1991, between 75-80% of its assets were U.S. businesses:
most prominently, the two jewels of Macmillan and Official Airlines
Guide. Thus at some level, MCC might have been seen as a glorified
holding company of U.S. businesses, in which case maybe its proper
" home " should have been deemed to be the United States. (Imagine, as a
thought experiment, if Macmillan had never been bought by MCC and
was just a standalone U.S. corporation. Now imagine further that one
day it decided to incorporate a Bermudan shell company, merged itself
into it, and then announced it was henceforth a Bermudan company.
Surely that self-characterization might raise some eyebrows with what
would be clearly still a U.S. business. This is a variation on a stunt
allegedly pulled by Singer, a once-American but then Singaporean sew
ing machine company, when it wanted to "re-Americanize" itself before
filing for chapter 1 1 in the United States. ) 4
Why did establishing MCC's "home" as either the United Kingdom
or the United States matter so much? There are several reasons the
debtor's home matters in bankruptcy. First, some countries like debtors
to file for bankruptcy within their home courts as an anti-sham rule, a
requirement that is usually enforced indirectly by dismissing petitions
for bankruptcy from foreign debtors whom a local court decides should
file elsewhere. For example, some thought this type of "jurisdictional
stretching" occurred when Russian oil giant Yukos tried to file a chapter
1 1 bankruptcy proceeding in Texas, notwithstanding Yukos' utter lack of
connection to the United States. 5 But that was not the main reason in
this case; indeed, MCC's assets were so dispersed around the world it
4. See LYNN M. LoPucKI, Cot:RTING FAILURE (University of Michigan Press 2005), at
22 7-28 (internal quotations and citations omitted) .
5. See I n r e Yukos O i l Co. , 3 2 1 B . R . 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing petition
as exercise of discretion, although acknowledging subject-matter jurisdiction and venue) .
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was unlikely any court would kick it out for lack of jurisdiction. A more
important reason (although not the only one) the administrators and
their lawyers wanted to determine MCC's home was that a debtor' s
home becomes relevant fo r many complicated legal issues, such a s choice
of law questions, that arise in cross-border bankruptcy cases. Presum
ably, where MCC's petition was filed would set the agenda for courts in
considering which country was MCC' s presumptive home (on the as
sumption, which is often true but not invariably, that debtors generally
file for insolvency in their home jurisdictions) .
MCC also had other considerations about where to file that were not
even related to its home. The least subtle one was good old-fashioned
forum shopping: that there are different rules under U . S . and U.K.
bankruptcy law that apply-irrespective of where the debtor's home is
that the case-placers wanted to arbitrage as best they could. So in
watching where MCC filed its bankruptcy petition, observers were not
just reading where the home country might be implied, but also looking
for broader signs of which procedural laws MCC wanted to operate under
in administering its bankrupt cy.
Just in case the reader thinks this might have been an easy, binary
decision (U.K. vs. U.S.), she should understand an important further
aspect about transnational bankruptcies. Simply because a company files
in one country does not mean that every other country will agree with
that choice. (Nor does it even mean that the company cannot turn
around and file a second bankruptcy proceeding in another country. )
Consider i n this regard the U . S . Bankruptcy Code's expansive assertion
of subj ect-matter jurisdiction. Section 54 1 of the Code states that a U.S.
bankrupt cy case has jurisdiction over all the debtor' s property, "wherev
er located, and by whomever held . " 6 This means that if MCC filed a
chapter 1 1 proceeding, the U.S. bankruptcy judge would have had
jurisdiction, under U.S. law, to administer assets sitting in a bank
account in London. But U.S. judges cannot issue enforceable writs to
London bankers, regardless of the power U.S. law purports to confer.
Only U.K. judges can issue U.K. writs. All a U.S. court can do is issue a
U.S. order, and then the debtor can take it to a London court to see if,
out of international "comity , " a U.K. court will recognize it and give it
legal force in the United Kingdom. (Many treaties regarding recognition
of judgments address these legal questions, such as the Brussels Conven
tion, but that specifically excludes insolvency proceedings from its
scope. ) 7 In other words, a cross-border bankruptcy depends upo n judicial
cooperation.
6. 11 U.S.C. §541 (a).
7. See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, done Sept. 27 1968, art. 1(2), 29 I.L.M. 1417-18.
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What if the U.K. court does not want to help? What if, for example,
the U . K. court thinks the debtor should have filed in the United
Kingdom? What if British creditors ignore the U.S. chapter 11 proceed
ing and initiate an involuntary insolvency proceeding in the United
Kingdom under U.K. law? Or what if the court wants to help, but British
law is different from U.S. law on what should happen to this London
bank account? Perhaps U.S. law says it is property of the bankruptcy
estate, but British law says the bank has a valid setoff and need not turn
the account over. One can quickly see how things become messy. (We
will assume for simplicity that the U.S. bankruptcy court would be
seeking to apply U.S. bankruptcy law, but even that is not a necessary
assumption . ) When courts disagree as to what should happen, things can
get ugly for the parties, who might be subject to orders commanding
them to do different things by different courts. Imagine , for example, a
U . S . judge issuing an order to the London bank that has a branch office
in New York (and hence personal jurisdiction in the United States) to
turn over the account and a British court enjoining it from doing so.
This is essentially what happened in the bankruptcy of a global shipping
company, United States Lines . 8
Perhaps envisioning this potential for problems , some countries
countenance multiple proceedings in different countries and permit
" ancillary " bankruptcy cases. In the United States, this was covered
until very recently by section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. A section 304
proceeding is like a limited or " mini" bankruptcy, restricted to U.S.
situated assets (unlike a regular , or "plenary" bankruptcy, which covers
all the debtor's assets whenever located, per §54 1 ) . Its function is to
allow a foreign bankruptcy representative, who is administering a for
eign debtor' s bankruptcy in a court presumably in the debtor' s home
country, to come to the United States and open a limited proceeding to
bring U.S. -located assets under the protection of the U.S. bankruptcy
courts. For example, a section 304 proceeding could be used to stop state
law attachment proceedings against U.S. assets of a foreign debtor in
bankruptcy proceedings abroad. What happens to those U.S. assets , once
they have been corralled into a U. S. forum? Are they distributed in
accordance with U.S. bankruptcy law (as the jurisdiction with territorial
sovereignty over the assets) to creditors who show up to the section 304
proceeding, or are they administered under the bankruptcy law of the
foreign jurisdiction (which is presumably the law of the debtor ' s
"home" ) ? Should i t depend on the case? I f so, should i t depend o n how
8. See Felixstowe Dock Co. v. U. S. Lines, Inc. , [ 1989] Q.B. 360 (declining to dissolve
British injunction that forbade turnover of British assets to main chapter 11 reorganization
proceeding in New York) ; In re Maclean lndus., Inc. , 76 B.R. 291 ( Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(sanctioning foreign creditor for not respecting U.S. automatic stay in same chapter 1 1 ) .
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different the foreign laws are? Should it depend on how U. S. creditors
would fare under them?
These questions helped prompt an explosion of bankruptcy scholar
ship. Some scholars, the "universalists," say that the best solution is to
have one bankruptcy law generally govern everywhere-the law of the
debtor's home country-so that ancillary proceedings should essentially
be conducted under foreign law. The reasoning is that then it will not
matter, from a choice of law perspective, where the business' assets
happen to be scattered around the world on the day bankruptcy occurs.
(Universalists worry that otherwise banks will have to follow all the
debtor's assets from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to figure out which
bankruptcy law will apply if the debtor ever falters-an expensive
undertaking.) 9 Others, the "territorialists, " respond that that is wishful
thinking: not only are there operational difficulties in defining a debtor's
"home," especially for messy situations like Maxwell, but also there are
real concerns about sovereignty that will not go away easily; countries
will not want to cede jurisdiction over assets falling under their physical
control, because they will want to protect local creditors and local
interests that will most likely be privileged under domestic law. Accord
ingly, until there is the establishment of some international supra
tribunal that can force countries to turn over assets, or until some mega
worldwide bankruptcy treaty is ratified, we should just stick with the
bright-line status quo of strict territorial jurisdiction. Viewed another
way, there should be no such thing as "main" and "ancillary" bankrupt
cy proceedings; there should just be "co-equal" proceedings in every
locale where the bankrupt debtor has assets, regardless of the debtor's
home, that are each subject to local bankruptcy law. 10 Still others, the
"contractualists, " think that if the concern universalists really have with
territorialism is the messiness of a bunch of different legal rules applying
based on the happenstance of where a debtor's assets are located on the
day it files for bankruptcy, then a better way to promote efficiency would
be to allow companies to chose up front which bankruptcy rules will
apply in the event they ever go bankrupt. 1 1 Companies that choose
outrageously pro-debtor regimes will be punished by their lenders, who
will offset a premium in pricing their loans. The market will generally
police matters, and certain adjustments can be made for situations in
which the market cannot work well.
9. See, e.g. , Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 2276 (2000) .
10. See, e.g. , Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in Internation
al Bankruptcy, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 221 6 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Colloquy, International Bankruptcy: Resolving
Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2252 (2000).
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In the United States, the way section 304 worked for ancillary
proceedings was by allowing a U.S. bankruptcy judge the discretion to
cooperate with a foreign court, by "turning over" the U.S. assets to the
foreign representative, presumably to be administered under foreign law.
This seems like universalism, assuming the foreign representative comes
from the debtor's home country. But section 304 only allowed a judge to
turn over assets after considering a list of factors. Some of these factors
covered the difference between U.S. law and foreign law, as well as the
possibly negative effect foreign law could have on U.S. creditors' divi
dends. These concerns reflect the position of the territorialists. So
section 304 was sort of a hodge-podge that both the universalists and the
territorialists alike claimed buttressed their respective positions (al
though the universalists probably had the slight edge based on the case
law). What this meant for the Maxwell case was that if MCC chose to file
in United Kingdom, there would very likely be a section 304 proceeding
filed in the United States to deal with the U.S. assets. If it filed in the
United States, then there would probably be a British ancillary proceed
ing. So the stakeholders waiting to see where MCC would file were really
waiting to see where MCC would file its main bankruptcy proceeding.
Because the main bankruptcy proceeding would mostly be driving the
show, and because disadvantaged litigants would probably attack the
choice, these watchers were waiting with some anxiety.
MCC's creditors, and the bankruptcy community more generally,
were surprised by what happened. MCC filed in both jurisdictions. This
was not a main proceeding in one and an ancillary in the other. No, this
was a highly unusual "parallel" filing of two main proceedings in both
the United States (a chapter 1 1 petition under the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code) and the United Kingdom (a scheme of arrangement under the
Insolvency Act of 1986). Both petitions were filed within a day of each
other in December 1991. Some cynically suggested that Kevin Maxwell
wanted to file in the United States so he could stay in control of MCC,
because U.S. bankruptcy law, in contrast to U.K. law, does not displace
management upon filing bankruptcy. Upon this decision, however , the
other British directors worried that filing chapter 1 1 was an admission
that MCC was insolvent-which meant they had a duty under U.K.
corporate law to put MCC into bankruptcy, and they were not sure a
U.S. chapter 1 1 filing would discharge this duty, so they filed in the
United Kingdom to cover themselves.
Whatever the reason for the choice, people thought this would be
chaos. What would happen? How could two proceedings assert over
lapping subject-matter jurisdiction to all MCC's worldwide assets? Which
law would apply, and to which assets? The ancillary proceeding system
which is supposed to foster international comity in cross-border bank
ruptcies-was being turned on its head. In a "parallel" filing, which
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judge would get to call the shots? Would it be the first one to issue an
order? Would there thus be a race for hearings? What would happen if
the second judge countermanded the first judge and issued an injunction
enforcing his will? Would there be a devolution into "dueling injunc
tions? " How could there be a plan of reorganization (or scheme of
arrangement)? Capturing this apparent disorder (just when everyone
thought the late Maxwell's affairs could not get any more confusing) was
one simple example of confusion: no-one was sure who was running
MCC. Under British law, the administration petition instantly divested
the board of directors of powers and vested control in the court
appointed administrators. Under U.S. law, however, the company's man
agement was still in control and not beholden to any "administrators"
that were foreign to U.S. law. Suffice it to say, things were looking grim.
(In the scholarly arena, the universalists and the territorialists at first
seemed equally horrified.)
The Beautiful
Yet there was a method to this madness. Indeed, the decision to file
the parallel proceedings was not just a jurisdictional hedge; it was a
conscious decision to elide the difficult choice of law (and even choice of
jurisdiction) questions that would bog down the case from the outset
when there was non-trivial ambiguity to MCC's home. Had MCC filed in
the United Kingdom alone, for example, then U.S. creditors may have
tried to get the case dismissed on a forum non conveniens argument, or
at the very least might have launched a choice of law fight and sought a
declaration of the applicability of U.S. bankruptcy law to the proceed
ings, notwithstanding the case's location in a British forum. By filing in
both jurisdictions, MCC avoided a jurisdictional fight by basically keep
ing everyone guessing. Parties were able to interpret the swirling legal
ambiguities self-servingly, thus deferring difficult problems to a later
date.
But the real lynchpin to this plan was to bring both courts on board
as soon as possible by hammering out a set of ground rules on how to
deal with disputes before they arose, so the Felixs towe spectre of dueling
injunctions could be avoided. This was done by designing a joint "proto
col," fashioned by the U.K. administrators and an examiner appointed
by the U.S. court (to be the American cognate to the administrators).
This was accomplished quickly, and within about a month (by January
1992), both courts had entered orders implementing the famous "Max
well Protocol. " Among other things, the protocol acknowledged that the
administrators would be recognized formally in the United States as the
management of MCC ; that intermediate compromise rules to U.S. and
U.K. law would govern such procedural issues as the deadline to file
claims; that the administrators, as managers, would consult with the
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examiner before taking major action with MCC; that the administrators
and examiner would negotiate a single chapter 1 1 plan/scheme of ar
rangement that would be co-presented to creditors in each jurisdiction
simultaneously and subjected to each jurisdiction's voting rules; and,
most importantly, that the courts would try to resolve disputed legal
issues as the case unfolded collaboratively, to the maximum extent
permissible by law, with the administrators and examiner pre-discussing
their legal positions.
The protocol was ingenious and, in at least one sense, something of
a vindication of the ad hoe contractualists-although even they had some
wind taken out of their sails. 12 It meant that the lawyers could get
around to negotiating a rescue plan (which, sensibly, resulted in selling
off the profitable standalone businesses such as Macmillan as indepen
dent entities and liquidating the empire's dregs) , while legal squabbles
would be deferred or ideally avoided. As tax lawyers will remind, taxes
deferred are almost as good as taxes avoided. This approach, for the most
part, worked. The administrators and examiner shrewdly identified the
issues that would likely bring up jurisdictional fights and headed them
off at the pass. For example, one intractable way cross-border insolven
cies raise disputes pertains to protecting local creditors and local inter
ests, because favored creditors under local law will want their bankrupt
cy law to apply to as many of the debtor's assets as possible and will
shun the application of foreign law.13 Recognizing this consensus-unrav
eling potential, the joint plan/scheme stipulated that all " priority"
creditors in the U.S. and all "preferred" creditors in the U.K. would be
paid in full at plan confirmation, thus silencing the constituencies most
likely to care about choice of law. Recall that it was deliberately never
decided in the protocol which substantive bankruptcy law would govern
resolution of the assets. Following this idea of avoiding a choice of law
showdown, the plan further provided that the proceeds of all the assets
sold, once these special claimants were paid off, would be put into an
international pot and would be shared by all creditors, regardless where
they filed their claims (provided that they did not effectively try to
double-recover). With many potential hot spots defused, it is not surpris
ing that when the scheme/plan was ultimately unveiled in February
1993, it was approved by 99% majorities in both jurisdictions and
12. See In re Maxwell Communication Corp. plc, 186 B.R. 807, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
( noting protocol "did not purport-and could not-govern the choice of law issues that are
at the crux of this case"), affd 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. See John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The
Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests, " 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1899 (2006); see
also In re Maxwell Communications Corp. plc, 93 F.3d 1036, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting
complicating consideration of "potential effect[s] " on "local economies" in deciding wheth
er to cooperate out of comity with foreign bankruptcy proceedings ).
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confirmed in both courts by the summer. Maxwell was over-or at least
mostly so.

The Exquisite
There was, however, one wrinkle with the seeming smoothness of
the Maxwell case. To be sure, it was only one, narrow choice of law
dispute. Because over $100 million was at stake, however, passions were
inflamed. The issue involved pre-bankruptcy payments to several banks
by MCC. The payments arose out of the disposition of one of Macmillan's
subsidiaries, called "QUE," to Prentice-Hall in 1991 (recall Macmillan
itself was a subsidiary of MCC). When QUE was sold, MCC used the
proceeds in November 1991 to reduce its credit lines at several banks,
who by this point were clamoring hungrily for repayment. American
readers trained in bankruptcy will recognize this as a voidable prefer
ence under U.S. law, as the unusual transfer occurred within the 90 days
preceding filing. Under U.K. law, by contrast, a payment to be voidable
requires not just improvement of the creditor's position as an objective
matter, but also an actual intent by the debtor to prefer the creditor
("playing favorites, " so to speak) . There was a good argument that these
transfers of the QUE proceeds under U.K. law would not rise to the level
of being what were called "reviewable transactions." So it is not tricky
to figure out who argued what on choice of law: the banks maintained
(to keep their money) that U.K. law had to apply to these impugned
transfers, and the administrators/examiner maintained (to disgorge the
payments as preferences to add back to the communal creditor pool) that
U.S. law governed.
The protocol had nothing to say about this. It simply encouraged
courts to work out disputes collaboratively but did not opine which
substantive bankruptcy law would govern in any given dispute. The
plan/scheme also sidestepped this issue, wisely not wanting to rock the
cooperative boat; it merely provided that if and when any money came in
from a preference dispute, under whatever law, such money would be
distributed at a later time to the creditors' liquidating trust. Indeed, one
impatient (and prescient) bank tried to preempt this process by seeking
an injunction in U.K. court forbidding the administrators from voiding
its transfer under U.S. law. The injunction request was an attempt to get
an effective declaratory judgment that (favorable) U.K. law would con
trol any preference challenge against the bank, wherever brought. It
succeeded, albeit briefly; an interim injunction was granted by a duty
judge barring the administrators from seeking to set aside the bank's
payments in U.S. court under U.S. law. But shortly thereafter, the main
bankruptcy judge in the United Kingdom (now-Lord Hoffman), properly
vacated the injunction as impermissibly and prematurely trying to
dictate how the choice of preference law question should be resolved. An
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injunction would be against the spirit of the protocol's command that the
two countries' judges resolve disputed issues in concert and not by
issuing anti-suit injunctions. Lord Hoffman also observed that a choice of
law matter should be resolved by the court in which the dispute is going
to be heard, not preemptively by another court through an injunction.
Thus even if the banks wanted U.K. law to apply, a possibility that Lord
Hoffman was not foreclosing, they should not be making that argument
in a U.K. forum unless and until a litigation had been initiated in the
United Kingdom. If litigation were to arise in U.S. court (a likely
development given the basis of the claim in U.S. law), then the choice of
law question would have to be passed on by the U.S. judge in due
course. 14
Accordingly, after the reorganization plan/rescue scheme was con
firmed and claims processing began in 1993, the QUE preference dispute
could no longer be avoided. As expected, the administrators and examin
er jointly initiated an adversary proceeding in the U.S. court seeking to
recover the bank payments as preferences under U.S. law. (Theoretically,
they could have launched such an action in the U.K. court had they
desired--especially since the attempt to enjoin them from doing so
failed-but they probably predicted that the odds of finding that U.S.
law would govern the impugned transactions were better if that choice of
law question were submitted to a U.S. court.) When bankruptcy profes
sors talk about "the Maxwell decision, " they are usually talking about
this specific piece of litigation: the U.S. adversary proceeding regarding
the challenged bank payments. 15 (Bankruptcy professors also get excited
about the Maxwell case because a bankruptcy professor, Jay Westbrook
from the University of Texas, was appointed special amicus curiae by the
Bankruptcy Court to provide an opinion on the choice of law question,
and professors tend to get excited at the implication academic opinions
are valued by courts.)
In August 1994, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Brozman issued a long and
thoughtful choice-of-law opinion outlining the complexity of the issue.
On the one hand, MCC's home, notwithstanding its sizable U.S. asset
base, truly was the United Kingdom. Recall, as discussed above, that the
debtor's home is often relevant in choice of law issues in bankruptcy.
Indeed, prior case law had held that a section 304 ancillary proceeding
must apply the debtor' s home country avoidance law. 16 But because MCC
was a full-blown "plenary" case under chapter 1 1, this precedent was
14. See Barclays Bank plc v. Homan & Ors. (In re Maxwell Communication Corp.
plcJ, [ 1992 ] BCC 757, affd [1993] BCLC 680 (C.A. ) .
15. (In re Maxwell Communication Corp. pie), 1 70 B.R. 8 0 0 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd 93 F. 3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). See Maxwell
Communication Corp. plc. ex rel. Homan et al. v. Barclays Bank plc.

16. See In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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not binding on the choice of avoidance law issue. In fact, another
precedent had expressly allowed foreign bankruptcy representatives to
use chapter 1 1 plenary proceedings simply to bring an avoidance action
under U.S. law even if the United States was not the debtor's home. 17 So
even though not required by precedent, Judge Brozman did begin her
analysis by determining MCC's home was in the United Kingdom, which
she viewed as a factor in favor of applying U.K. law.
Additionally, Judge Brozman further considered that the loan con
tracts were all based in London and were made out to British (and
French) banks. Thus the debtor's home and the contractual relationship
both suggested a connection to the United Kingdom. On the other hand,
the main asset providing the source of the challenged funds, QUE , was
an American company, owned by an American subsidiary, and some of
the transferred payments physically cleared at U.S. branches of the
relevant banks (indeed, the QUE proceeds were first deposited into a
NatWest U.S. dollars account in New York en route to London) . So there
was a U.S. connection to the transactions too.
On the whole, however, while there were connections to both the
United States and United Kingdom, the "center of gravity" of the
challenged transactions was found to be in England. As such, Judge
Brozman ruled that English law would apply. (Interestingly, she con
curred in Professor Westbrook's ultimate conclusion that U.K. law
should govern, but declined in adopting his reasoning: a bright-line,
universalist rule that the debtor's home-country law should govern
bankruptcy avoidance issues, wherever they might arise and be litigat
ed.) 18 Having resolved the threshold choice of law question, Judge Broz
man technically might have been able to adjudicate an English law
preference dispute in her courtroom under the British Insolvency Act of
1986, but that would seem a poor use of institutional resources. Accord
ingly, since there was no action that could proceed under U.S. law, which
is what was pled in the complaint, she dismissed the adversary proceed
ing. Recognizing that it was probably a loser under U.K. law to allege a
reviewable transaction regarding the QUE payments, the administrators
and examiner never tried to replead it in England before Lord Hoffman.
They did, however fight appeals in the United States up to the District
Court (where they lost) and the Court of Appeals (where they lost again) .
While many talk of "the Maxwell decision" as referring to the 1996
Second Circuit published opinion, a much richer analysis of the issues
actually occurs in Judge Brozman's initial holding on the matter.
1 7. See In re Axona International Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988), affd 1 15 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) .
18. For more discussion of his proposal, which he softens slightly but nevertheless
soundly sticks to, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communications,
64 Fordham L. Rev. 2531 ( 1996).
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The Sublime
When thinking of the lessons of Maxwell, at least of the specific
preference litigation, one of the most succinct and apt is Professor
Westbrook's: "politeness matters. " 19 The ultimate arbiter of the non
applicability of American preference law was Judge Brozman in a New
York forum. The same holding could have been reached had Lord
Hoffman in London upheld the injunction that forbade the administra
tors from launching a preference action in New York. But consider how
that would have been received by an American judge where cross-border
goodwill and cooperation had been steadily building up over the months
of the proceedings. Is it off-base to speculate that a different result might
have obtained-especially given the arguably close facts-had, rather
than being asked whether the case in her courtroom should be dismissed
due to the applicability of U.K. law, Judge Brozman had been command
ed, by a U .K. judge issuing an antisuit injunction, that the case would
have to be dismissed due the applicability of U.K. law?
This is an important lesson, to be sure. But what might be even
better to think about as the lessons of Maxwell stem not from the
specific and highly visible litigation to the Second Circuit in 1996, but
from the less litigated but nevertheless remarkable joint plan of reorga
nization/scheme of arrangement of 1993. There are three considerations
worth some further reflection on that plan and on the process that
produced it.
First, Maxwell, properly viewed, should be seen as a success rather
than a failure of the cross-border insolvency " system. " That is, the
theoretical purist at the time likely despaired that the lack of certainty
in international commercial law and the absence of a multinational
bankruptcy treaty necessitated the duplicative ambiguity of " parallel
proceedings. ' ' The Maxwell proceedings were pulled together ad hoe and
out of a hat; only by sheer good luck did they work out so smoothly. A
better legal world would have made clear up front that the United
Kingdom was MCC 's home and hence the whole insolvency should have
proceeded in British court under British law, with perhaps a U.S. section
304 hearing to assist matters. In short, pure universalism would have
provided a swifter and more efficient resolution of the case. That may be
so, but that is not the world in which we live and certainly was not the
world of a decade ago. To be sure, universalism is on the rise and gaining
acceptance, 20 but the world today still does no t yet have a global
19. See ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAw OF D EBTORS AND
(4th ed. 2001 ) at 102 1 .
20. See John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Jncrementalism: A Model for International
Bankruptcy, 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 935 (2005) (suggesting incremental acceptance of universal
ism throughout various insolvency reform efforts).
CREDITORS
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insolvency treaty or any other such clear universalist mandate. In the
face of that undeveloped legal environment, Maxwell could well have
devolved into a territorialist race for assets that would have killed the
chance to sell off viable businesses within the empire. Thus the theoreti
cal possibility that Maxwell might have been better under pure univer
salism should not overshadow the more important fact that it was very,
very good. Creditors saved millions of dollars as many healthy businesses
were preserved as going concerns. (In fact, some international law and
relations scholars even take the view that rather than being a second
best outcome, the "ad hocracy" of the Maxwell case was actually its
greatest strength: a functionalist tour-de-force of institutions working
across jurisdictional boundaries and traditional constraints to deal with a
specific legal problem.) 21
Second, the Maxwell insolvency reminds us that whatever the sys
tem, and whatever the legal default rules, when cross-border proceedings
rely upon a decentralized network of courts for enforcement in the
absence of an all-powerful supranational tribunal, forum shopping will
be inevitable. When multiple plausible claims to jurisdiction lie, parties
will always seek to maximize their legal advantage by playing a venue
arbitrage. In Maxwell, this was seen in the choice of preference law fight
most directly. There is, however, a different, more positive side to forum
shopping. Consider the threshold filing decision: it was presented, cyni
cally, as an English management trying to skirt English law by seeking
refuge in an American bankruptcy court (a practice that persists to this
day in cross-border disputes22 ) . That is the negative side of forum
shopping. But now consider that one of the other reasons MCC wanted
to file in the United States was that its directors were concerned that the
swift pace of U.K. administration could lead to piecemeal sell-off of the
assets, rather than the slower pace of chapter 1 1 that is more conducive
to going-concern sales. Indeed, it has been suggested that one reason
Macmillan was able to stay in business is that its U.S. trading partners
were comforted that it was under chapter 1 1 and hence would be more
likely to survive intact than it might have been under U.K. law. Thus
while there may be bad sides of forum shopping-and there usually
are-there may also be good sides too. The theoretical import of this
observation is that rather than worry about the negative forum shopping
potential of contractualism (or even universalism for that matter) , its
positive potential deserves more serious consideration.
2 1 . See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States,
6 Eur. J. Int'l L. 503 ( 1995); see also Lore Unt, International Relations and International
Insolvency Cooperation Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialouge, 28
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1037 ( 1997 ) .
2 2 . See In re Yukos Oil Co., supra note 5 .
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Third (and this is really more of a caveat than a lesson), Maxwell
should serve as a reminder that business ventures, like people, can be
sometimes unpredictable and odd. That is, while the territorialist might
seize upon MCC's bankruptcy to prove the difficulty of establishing a
debtor company's "home" due to the competing tug between the United
Kingdom and United States in that case, a better conclusion might be
that Maxwell was an atypical array of overlapping and deliberately
obfuscated corporate entities. Accordingly, if universalism can find a
home country easily in the other nine cases out of ten (and even in
Maxwell , Judge Brozman did ultimately find the essential "Englishness"
of MCC), then we should not overly fixate on the unusual case at the
margin-even if it is highly visible and intriguing. Indeed, in the less
publicized resolution of the private side of Maxwell' s empire, Headington
was basically administered under smoothly cooperative universalist pro
ceedings: a U.K. administration as the main proceeding and a U.S.
section 304 ancillary proceeding in which the court willingly and helpful
ly cooperated. 23 To be sure, there will always be difficult cases. But even
difficult cases can be resolved, and their resolution will only strengthen
fledgling efforts at universalism that depend upon identifying home
jurisdictions. Consider in this regard the recent clarification of home
country rules by the European Court of Justice in the Eurofood case
under the new EU Insolvency Regulation. 24 Therefore, territorialist
critics who seize upon Maxwell to show the difficulty of identifying a
home country may be living in a past decade, left behind by not only the
rapid pace of international insolvency reform but also its increasing
refinement at dealing with issues like identification of home country.

The Conclusion
The specific aftermath of the Maxwell insolvency was that Kevin, his
brother Ian (the Happy Loman of the Maxwell clan), and some of their
inner circle cronies stood trial for fraud. After a year-long proceeding,
they were all ultimately acquitted in 1996. It was an expensive case that
resulted in yet another embarrassing loss for the U. K ' s Serious Fraud
Office . Pergamon was sold to rival publisher Elseveier in 1992; Macmil
lan went through its own chapter 1 1 and was sold as a standalone
business in 1995 to a German company seeking an entree into the
States. The Daily News also had its own chapter 1 1 and survives to this
day as a New York icon. The Mirror lives on, too; it ultimately merged
into media conglomerate Trinity. (Maxwell' s failed attempt to launch an
English-language European newspaper, The European, did not survive; it
was sold to the quirky Barclay brothers of Brecqhou, who shut it down
23. See In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) .
24. See Eurofood IFSC Ltd., Case C-34 1/04, European Court o f Justice (May 2 , 2006)
(interpreting EC Regulation 1346/2000).
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and now devote themselves to trying to secede from Sark, although they
have recently emerged to pick up The Telegraph from Lord Conrad Black
as he flails under indictment.) As mentioned, the pensioners got a lot of
their money back in the end. And better late than never, in 2001, the
DTI finally completed its 700-page report investigating the Maxwell
debacle. DTI found that although "The Publisher" single-handedly was
responsible for most of the transgressions ("Maxwell had always regard
ed the pension funds as his own and ran his companies and the pension
funds as if they were one"), the sons were not purely blameless. The
report explicitly stated that Kevin had acted "inexcusably" in his role
overseeing the pension funds as a trustee. Coopers and Goldman also got
their respective shares of blame as well, as did other professionals, but
by then it was water under the bridge. Indeed, by 2001, Kevin Maxwell
was on to new things, being feted as a rising-from-the-ashes success
story with his assumption of the chairmanship of Telemonde-which
wound up shortly thereafter in chapter 11.
Perhaps the Maxwell case's greatest legacy was in the seeds it sowed
for what is freshly enacted chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Scrapping (or, more accurately, augmenting) section 304 ancillary pro
ceedings, chapter 15 adopts a regime based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and the EU Insolvency Regulation.
Chapter 15 has two noteworthy characteristics: first, while being mostly
universalist in its design (and much more so than former section 304), it
retains some strongly territorialist caveats. Secondly, it codifies a swath
of procedural provisions aimed at facilitating cooperation and communi
cation amongst courts in cross-border settings. Both sets of attributes
find at least some root in Maxwell. The latter are obviously designed to
encourage the creation of Maxwell-inspired "protocols" and the value
enhancing judicial cooperation exhibited by Lord Hoffman and Judge
Brozman. The former, with a vague commitment to universalism but
with some territorialist retrenchment, might be seen, in a sense, as
embracing the very vagueness and indeterminancy that made the Max
well Protocol so unique: maybe in a touchy and inchoate area like
international bankruptcy it is better to leave some things fuzzy and see
what the future brings rather than hammer them out on Day One.
As for Maxwell himself, while he lies in peace in Israel (although
sometimes with broken glass thrown at his grave), whatever can be said
about his bending or in some instances outright breaking of the laws,
this Holocaust survivor built up an enormous empire-much of which
survives-turned around several major business ventures on the verge of
demise, and remains, without a doubt, one of the most interesting
entrepreneurs (or spies) of the Twentieth Century. One can only hope
that his assassins will be brought to justice soon.

